
EXCESSIVE TAXES LEAD TO INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT



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EXCESSIVE TAXES LEAD TO INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

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Exhorbitant taxes, like extreme necessity, destroy industry by producing despair; and even before they reach this pitch, they raise the wages of the labourer and manufacturer, and heighten the price of all commodities. An attentive disinterested legislature will observe the point when the emolument ceases, and the prejudice begins. But as the contrary character is much more common, 'tis to be feared that taxes all over Europe are multiplying to such a degree as will entirely crush all art and industry; tho' perhaps, their first increase, together with other circumstances, might have contributed to the growth of these advantages.

David Hume in his essay 'Of Taxes' written in 1756

EXCESSIVE TAXES LEAD TO INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

Although North Sea oil has at last begun to flow, the British economy is still floundering.

Ten years ago, when there was no thought of North Sea oil and inflation was running wild, the Economic Research Council (ERC) sponsored a series of papers entitled "A Programme for National Recovery", which examined the causes of inflation; the existing Balance-of-Payments difficulties; and the problems arising from growing public expenditure.

There was subsequently much talk in the Press about "cost-push-inflation", which attributed inflation to leap-frogging wage increases secured by Trades Unions able to hold the nation to ransom by bringing sections of the economy to a standstill.

The ERC questioned this thesis and in 1972 published a paper entitled "Excessive Taxes Lead to Stagflation", which tabulated the relevant statistics from official publications, from 1949 to 1970.

This statistical evidence challenged the widely held belief that wage-demands, by forcing up prices, had been responsible for inflation. Contrary to the general belief, it was shown that real wages (or take-home pay) during that period had unquestionally lagged behind the overall increase in prices,

The much publicised official remedy for inflation was to increase taxes in order to reduce Private Sector purchasing power.

We declared that this policy could not succeed because it would merely transfer demand from one portion of the Private Sector, via the Public Sector, to another portion of the Private Sector, leaving total demand unchanged.

From the evidence, it was clear that excessive Local and Central Government spending was the basic cause both of inflation and the growing stagnation.

The message was disregarded by those in authority. They continued to allege that the increasingly powerful Unions had been able to

1

seize an ever larger part of the national cake, thereby driving up prices and stimulating inflation.

We therefore decided to publish up-dated statistics to 1976. We are most grateful to Mr. M. C. MacDonald for carrying out this work and for his illuminating comments.

The official figures up to 1976 clearly show that the trends which we noted in the 1960's continued into the 1970's, and that the basic cause of our malaise has not been excessive wages but the excessive portion of the national cake grabbed by the State.

One current example lately mentioned in the Press is that the whole benefit which the Government will receive from North Sea Oil during 1978 (about £700m) has already been appropriated to meet the losses of British Steel and British Leyland.

These losses have not been brought about by excessive wages but by the gross inefficiency of over-manning and strikes. Almost 2½-times as many men are needed to produce one ton of steel or a motor car in Britain than in any other Western country.

The ERC is not a political body. It strives to be objective, but it would not be objective if it failed to draw attention to the evidence that taxation has always been upward under a Labour Government, but has to some extent declined under a Conservative Government.

However, neither Party has achieved that decisive reduction in direct taxation on incomes which is essential if the will to work and the spirit of enterprise are to be restored.

Surprisingly enough, the Unions—in spite of their undoubted power—have not even succeeded in maintaining the workers' share of the national cake. Their share remained constant between 1949 and 1970, and has since actually declined, whereas the share seized by the State has increased.

It is a tragedy for the whole working population—including those who belong to Unions—that Union Leaders have used their great power primarily to demand still more power by pressing for Closed Shops (which many people regard as a tyranny) and by encouraging local "industrial action" over inter-union disputes, as well as wanton overmanning.

The endless debilitating strikes in some of our major industries have undermined confidence in the British economy, and have contributed to the painful increase in unemployment.

If our Union Leaders were to emulate West German Leaders and resolve inter-union difficulties by negotiation; co-operate with industry so as to ensure that it would make a profit and could therefore afford to pay higher real wages (take-home pay); and if both sides then combined to insist on the Government reducing its expenditure and consequently

taxation, the resulting increase in prosperity would enable higher real wages to be paid, and would provide capital to finance expansion and work for the unemployed.

West Germany and Japan have excessively favourable Balancesof-Payment, which may damage the economy of the Western World if they continue. However, the reason these two countries have achieved such a remarkable favourable situation is that they have persistently kept Government expenditure within the income which the Government receives from taxation.

It is worth noting that taxation in West Germany increased in the 1970's in proportion to the national product, and has reached a level about equal to the UK; consequently, West German growth has slowed down and unemployment has appeared.

The important point is that real wages in those two countries have steadily risen, which has encouraged the workers to exert themselves to the full and investors to finance expansion.

Official statistics make it abundantly clear that it is excessive Government expenditure (commonly known as the "borrowing requirement") which has created inflation, both in Britain and the United States, and has caused our currencies to decline in value.

The situation is, of course, worse in Britain than in the U.S. because inflation in Britain has been greater and has continued for longer. Moreover, the much higher British taxes have discouraged investment at home, while encouraging more successful businesses to expand overseas, thereby adding still further to the despondency of the nation.

PATRICK DE LASZLO Chairman

JULY 1978

EDWARD HOLLOWAY Hon. Secretary

SUMMARY

- 1. The share of the national product taken by taxes rose from 33½% in 1946 to about 44½% in 1970. It fell to about 38% by 1973, but again increased to 41% by 1975-76.
- Rising taxes were associated with a Labour Government; falling taxes with a Conservative Government.
- The portion of total taxes levied on Earnings was roughly stable at about 50-53% over the period 1955 to 1972; it rose to 61% by 1975-76. The proportion of taxes on Expenditure fell from 41% in 1973 to less than 37% in 1975-76.
- 4. Inflation was exploited as an excuse to increase taxes on Earnings since it was alleged that this would reduce demand and help to restrain inflation. In addition, the Labour Government felt constrained to keep down taxes on expenditure so as to give the appearance of restraining inflation. The Labour point of view tends to be:
 - (a) It is morally right to tax Earnings rather than Expenditure since most taxes on Expenditure affect people with low incomes more than those with high incomes.
 - (b) In any event, taxes on Expenditure put up prices and consequently emphasise any increase in inflation.
- 5. The high overall level of taxation, and in particular high taxes on Earnings, has meant that working people have in fact borne an increasing share of the total burden of taxation, while at the same time employers have been discouraged from taking on more employees because employment is so highly taxed.

It can clearly be seen that the rise in the level of total taxation has been associated throughout the period with a rise in the general level of unemployment; and the sharp rise in the share of taxes paid on earnings has been associated, in 1975-76, with a further substantial rise in unemployment.

6. Taxes on Capital have in general declined. Taxes on changes in the holding of assets have not been large but they have impaired flexibility when the owners of assets wish to change them to a better use (probably one giving more employment). This applies to Stamp Duties and Capital Gains tax, both of which should be abandoned in order to improve the flexibility of the movement of assets—and, incidentally, to reduce the number of Civil Servants. The loss to the Treasury would be trivial, and could if necessary be recovered by increasing tax on Capital Transfers between individuals—in contrast to changes in assets held by the same individual.

Increased taxes on Earnings are demanded in order to support
payments for social security and unemployment, but if all taxes on
earnings were slashed the will to work would be increased and
at the same time more work would soon become available.

1. TOTAL TAXES

The share taken by taxes from the gross domestic product of the United Kingdom increased from a tow of 32.7% in 1956 to a high of 44.3% in 1970. After a fall to 38.1% by 1973, under a Conservative Government, there was a swing back to 41.0% by 1976 under the Labour Government.

The rise, from 33.5% in 1964 to 43.4% in 1969, under the Labour Government was the main feature identified in our paper in 1972.

The full story is shown in Table 1 (page 6) (basic tables for the individual taxes making up each group are included in the appendix).

In an official review comparing international taxes (Economic Trends, December 1977, page 111) it was pointed out that the United Kingdom fell from fifth place in a list of industrial countries in 1970 to tenth place by 1975—in terms of the percentage of tax paid in relation to gross national product. But the review stated that 'The UK figure reached a peak of 43.4% in 1970 and then declined until 1973 but has since started to rise again' (page 108).

Gross Domestic Product TABL relation to (

		90	2048	מימו ופיפטות ופופטות וח לווספים למוופים והיים		ance i ones				
Government	Total ta	Total taxes paid on:							Gross	Total
		Income		Expenditu	re²	Capital		Tota!	product	taxes as % of
		£ mn	*%	t mn	*	t mu	%	t mu	f mn	GDP
Conservative	1955	2,913	50.7	2,568	44.7	259	4.5	5,740	16,894	34.0
	1956	3,006	50.2	2,754	46.0	229	3.8	5,989	18,289	32.7
	1957	3,249	50.9	2,887	45.3	244	3.8	6,380	19,390	32.9
	1958	3,584	52.8	2,967	43.7	243	3.6	6,794	20,204	33.6
	1959	3,655	51.8	3,094	43.9	305	4.3	7,054	21,236	33.2
	1960	3,638	50.2	3,284	45.3	330	4.6	7,252	22,615	32.1
	1961	4,150	51.6	3,530	43.9	356	4.4	8,036	24,198	33.2
	1962	4,652	52.9	3,784	43.0	361	4.1	8,797	25,252	34.8
	1963	4,688	52.0	3,935	43.6	400	4.4	9,023	26,863	33.6
Labour	1964	5,034	51.5	4,354	44.5	391	4.0	9,779	29,182	33.5
	1965	5,765	52.3	4,883	44.3	366	33	11,014	31,212	35.3
	1966	6,370	52.6	5,343	1.44	393	3.2	12,106	33,083	36.6
	1967	7,171	53.1	5,905	43.7	431	3.2	13,507	34,877	38.7
	1968	7,920	52.2	6,691	44.1	555	3.7	15,166	37,390	40.6
	1969	8,680	50.8	7,659	44.8	748	4.4	17,087	39,338	43.4
Conservative	1970	10,107	52.7	8,291	43.2	797	4.2	19,195	43,368	44.3
	1971	10,719	53.1	8,646	42.9	804	4.0	20,169	49,151	41.0
	1972	11,416	53.3	9,040	42.2	980	4.6	21,436	54,958	39.0
	1973	13,232	54.7	9,917	41.0	1,028	4.3	24,177	63,492	38.1
Labour	1974	17,548	58.8	11,256	37.7	1,039	3.5	29,843	73,652	40.5
	1975	23,372	6.09	13,880	36.2	1,095	5.9	38,347	93,078	41.2
	1976	27,150	60.7	16,384	36.7	1,161	5.6	44,695	109,080	41.0

operation (expenditure related

assets by

loyment tax when in operation (expend ee Supplement B for details. p duties (which are a tax on charging ts). See Supplement C for details.

housing) and related

EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS SHARES OF THE NATIONAL INCOME

SHARES BEFORE TAX

The share-out of the national income between Employees and Employers would seem to be the main pretext for industrial strife. However, as shown in Table 2 (page 9), the gross share-before tax- has remained about 22% for Employers and 78% for Employees over the past 20 years.

This feature was described as follows in our earlier paper (page 10). "It is a remarkable phenomenon that the working of Britain's free labour market over more than 20 years maintained the 'primary' division of income from production between the Employers and Wage-and-Salaryearners at a ratio so close to constant that it can be described as stable.

"Of course the simple numeric abstraction is only the summit of a whole mountain of inter-related bargains. Most of the bargaining is done collectively by Trade Unions and is often rumbustious and a source of social friction. However it is significant that the operation of this market has little to do with the supply of labour. If it had, the present large increases in the number of unemployed would be accompanied by a fall in wages.

'The strange fact is that the multitude of bargains in the Labour market over the last two decades has stabilised the 'primary' division of total income from production between Employers and Wage-earners at a rate of 22.5/77.5 per cent so it is reasonable to assume that Employers have found it essential to secure their 22.5 per cent in order to remain in business, Indeed the long term stability of the ratio implies that if the Employers' share falls much below 22.5 per cent, the autonomous working of the market will move to restore the normal ratio by restricting the collective income of Wage-earners."

Fortunately we have detailed figures which show how the nation's total income from the production of goods and services in 1976 was divided between Employers and Wage-earners before the Government took away a part of each share in taxes and levied insurance contributions -and we can also show the division between Employers and Wageearners after the Government took away a part of each share.

SHARES—AFTER TAX

The net-after tax-income which finally remains at the disposal of Employers and Employees is not determined by the working of the labour market alone. Government takes a large part of each "primary" share by

1976		£ million
Primary income of employers:		
Gross trading profits as in Blue Book, Table 1.1:		
Companies	12,445	
Public corporations and other public enterprises	4,580	
	17.025	
add back	•	
Employers' contributions to		
National insurance etc	5,085	
Total primary income of employers		22,110
Primary income of employees (table 4.1):		
Wages and salaries	67,185	
Pay of H.M. Forces	1,473	

4.896

10,208

83.762

105,872

Figures for 1955-76 are in Table 2

Superannuation funds etc.....

Earned from self-employment.....

Total primary income of employees.....

TOTAL NATIONAL INCOME FROM PRODUCTION

way of taxes and levies. But from what has been said above about the stabilising effect of the labour market on the ratio of "primary" shares it follows that if the Employers' disposable share in aggregate is reduced by taxation to less than about 22% of the total income from production, the autonomous working of the market will induce a corresponding reduction of the amount that Employers, collectively, can spend on wages and salaries. This has the effect of restricting the total "primary" share of Employees.

Table 1 (page 6) shows that from 1964 to 1970 and from 1974 to 1976 the Labour Government increased an already heavy burden of taxes and levies.

In this paper we are primarily concerned with taxes on the Income from the Production of goods and services (income tax on wages, salaries and earnings from self-employment; levied contributions to national insurance; the former S.E.T.; and Corporation Tax which replaced the earlier profits tax).

The effect of these taxes on the "primary" shares of Employers and

TABLE 2
Employees and Employers 'primary' share—before tax—
of the national income

	Total	Employees	s' share²	Employers	' share
	income!	£mn	% of	£ mn	% of
			total		total
1955	16,221	12,625	77.8	3,596	22.2
1956	17,380	13,676	78.7	3,704	21.3
1957	18,269	14,427	79.0	3,842	21.0
1958	18,737	14,855	79.3	3,882	20.7
1959	19,869	15,574	78.4	4,295	21.6
1960	21,635	16,757	77.5	4,878	22.5
1961	22,904	18,015	78.7	4,889	21.3
1962	23,878	18,897	79.1	4,981	20.9
1963	25,437	19,791	77.8	5,646	22.2
1964	27,610	21,356	77.3	6,254	22.7
1965	29,643	22,971	77.5	6,672	22.5
1966	31,366	24,579	78.4	6,787	21.6
1967	32,923	25,620	77.8	7,303	22.2
1968	35,798	27,419	76.6	8,379	23.4
1969	38,575	29,396	76.2	9,179	23.8
1970	42,567	32,833	77.1	9,734	22.9
1971	47,100	36,583	77.7	10,517	22.3
1972	53,070	41,621	78.4	11,449	21.6
1973	61,841	48,224	78.0	13,617	22.0
1974	73,078	57,637	78.9	15,441	21.1
1975	90,477	73,515	81.3	16,962	18.7
1976	105,872	83,762	79.1	22,110	20.9

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Tables 1.1 and 4.1; also earlier Blue Books.

Employees in the total Income from Production from 1955 to 1976 is detailed in the following Table 3 (page 11) and Chart (page 13). It shows the share taken by Government; the after-tax, or disposable, Profit left in the hands of Employers; and the "take-home-pay" of Employees.

It will be seen that Employers' share (after tax)—that is to say, their disposable profits—expressed as a percentage share of the total Income from Production did not change much between 1955 and 1966 (the details of the employers share before and after tax is amplified in Table 4 (page 12)).

Over those years the mean annual share of Employers was 18.2%. The share ranged between a low of 17.1 and a high of 19.4—only about 1% on either side of the average. But from 1967 onwards the Employers'

¹ Equals total domestic income plus SET, less rent and imputed charge for consumption of non-trading capital.

Includes employers pension contributions etc.

share (after tax) was sharply reduced by the introduction of Corporation Tax in 1966 which had the effect of increasing tax on employers, while reducing it to some extent on "rentiers" receiving dividends. After 1973 there was also a slight effect due to the change to the imputation system of Corporation Tax.

The financial affairs of Employees and Employers were made more difficult by continual (and mainly unnecessary) changes in the tax system and tax rates.

The percentage share of the gross Income from Production which went to Employees in the form of "take-home-pay" was more stable. From 1955 to 1962 there was little change. The level was around 70-72%. But after 1963 the Employees share declined significantly. The figure for 1970 was 64.0% and by 1976 was down to 63.2%.

In contrast the share of Income from Production taken by Government Taxes followed a very different course. From 1955 to 1960 it increased slowly from about 10% to just over 11%. From 1961 to 1964, Government's share increased further to about 13% but it increased sharply after 1965 following the election of a Labour Government in 1964. The figure for 1970 was 22.2%.

The Conservative Government elected in 1970 then reduced the Government share to 19.2% in 1973. Further increases by the Labour Government elected at the beginning of 1974 brought the share back up to about 23% for 1975 and 1976.

The general picture which emerges from this analysis of the threeway division of the Income from Production over 22 years reveals a pronounced difference between the periods before and after 1965. During the decade from 1955-1965 the average percentage shares were:

Employers	18%
Employees	70%
Government	12%

But during the following decade from 1966-1976 there was a rapid increase in Government's share which reduced the other two, so that by 1976 the percentage shares had changed to:

Employers	14%
Employees	63%
Government	23%

	Total	Government taxes!	laxes,	Employees		Employers'	
	income	f mn	% of total	remaining	0% of total	remaining chara f mn	10 % of 10
				Stidle L IIII	101 IO 80	אומוב ד ווווו	5 6
1955	16.221	1,599	•6·6	11,528*	71.11	3,094	19.1
1056	17,380	1,732*	10.0	12,447*	71.6	3,201	18.4
1957	18.269	1,918	10.5	13,061	71.5	3,290	18.0
1958	18 737	2,236	11.9	13,296*	71.0	3,205	17.1
1959	19.869	2.292*	11.5*	13,961	70.3	3,616	18.2
1960	21,635	2,452*	11.3*	14.992*	69.3*	4,191	19.4
1961	22 904	2.837	12.4	15,998*	69.8	4,069	17.8
1962	73,878	3.193*	13.4	16,640	.1.69	4,045	16.9
1963	25 437	3.284*	12.9	17,506*	68.8	4,647	18.3
1964	27,610	3.632	13.2*	18,814*	68.1	5,164	18.7
1965	29,643	4,308	14.5	19,960*	67.3*	5,375	18.1
1966	31.366	4 621	14.7	21,125	67.3	5,620	17.9
1967	32,923	6.329	19.2	21,874	66.4	4,720	14.3
1968	35 798	7.095	19.8	23,216	64.9	5,487	15.3
1969	38 575	7 950	20.6	24,683	64.0	5,942	15.4
1970	42,567	9,447	22.2	27,226	64.0	5,894	13.8
1971	47 100	069 6	20.6	30,526	64.8	6,884	14.6
1972	53.070	10,126	19.1	35,080	1.99	7,864	14.8
1973	61.841	11.867	19.2	40,389	65.3	9,585	15.5
1974.	73.078	15,880	21.7	47,388	64.8	9,810	13.4
1975.	90.477	20.929	23.1	58,920	65.1	10,628	11.7
1976.	105.872	24.032	22.7	66.870	63.2	14,970	14.1

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Tables 1.1, 4.1 and 9.7; also earlier Blue Book. See footnote to Supplement A


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
TABLE 4
Employers share of income before and after tax

	Total income produc- tion!	of total before p		Taxes to levies p employ share²	oaid on	of total after pa	
					%		
			% of		taken		%
			total		bγ		after
	£ mn	£ mn	income	£ mn	taxes	£ mn	tax
1955	16,221	3,596	22.2	502	14.0	3,094	19.1
1956	17,380	3,704	21.3	503	13.6	3,201	18.4
1957	18,269	3,842	21.0	552	14.4	3,290	18.0
1958	18,737	3,882	20.7	677	17.4	3,205	17.1
1959	19,869	4,295	21.6	679	15.8	3,616	18.2
1960	21,635	4,878	22.5	687	14,1	4,191	19.4
1961	22,904	4,889	21.3	820	16.8	4,069	17.8
1962	23,878	4,981	20.9	936	18.8	4,045	16.9
1963	25,437	5,646	22.2	999	17.7	4,647	18.3
1964	27,610	6,254	22.7	1,090	17.4	5,164	18.7
1965	29,643	6,672	22.5	1,297	19.4	5,375	18.1
1966	31,366	6,787	21.6	1,167	17.2	5,620	17.9
1967	32,923	7,303	22.2	2,583	35.4	4,720	14.3
1968	35,798	8,379	23.4	2,892	34.5	5,487	15.3
1969	38,575	9,179	23.8	3,237	35.3	5,942	15.4
1970	42,567	9,734	22.9	3,840	39.4	5,894	13.8
1971	47,100	10,517	22.3	3,633	34.5	6,884	14.6
1972	53,070	11,449	21.6	3,585	31.3	7,864	14.8
1973	61,841	13,617	22.0	4,032	29.6	9,585	15.5
1974	73,078	15,441	21.1	5,631	36.5	9,810	13.4
1975	90,477	16,962	18.7	6,334	37.3	10,628	11.7
1976	105,872	22,110	20.9	7,140	32.3	14,970	14.1

Source: See Tables 2 and 3.

EMPLOYEES, EMPLOYERS AND THE GOVERNMENT SHARES OF TOTAL INCOME FROM PRODUCTION AND SERVICES IN 1955 AND 1976





¹ As Table 2

² See Supplement D for details.

TAX AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The two features of taxation emphasised in the previous tables were the sharp increase in the proportion of national product taken by tax between 1966-1970—the first wave—and the change in relative emphasis on income tax between 1970-1975 when the income tax proportion rose from about 50% to about 60%

These two "waves" can be seen from Table 5 (page 15) to have coincided with the two main waves of increase in unemployment. The first wave in 1967-1968 which did not fall in 1969 in the manner which the government expected coincided with the increase in taxation at that time. The second wave in 1975-1976, coincided with the increase in tax on incomes.

When employers have to pay high rates of national insurance tax for each employee, they naturally keep as few as possible. When employees have to pay high income tax and see others receiving nearly as much by not working, they are quite happy to be relieved of the necessity to work for a living, and instead out for the dole.

As we pointed out in our 1972 paper, the government contention that tax increases were necessary to reduce inflation by reducing home demand "were, in our view, unsound. The Taxes which now oppress the Private Sector did not reduce Demand or halt Inflation. All they did was undermine confidence which was further weakened by continuing Inflation and eventually by mounting Unemployment" (page 6).

TABLE

and Unemployment

Cumulative

04000-

26.4800

Unemploy	Unemployment (000)	Tax as % of GDP	H GDP		Income tax	Income taxes as % of all ta
Average	Change over year	Average	Change over year	Cumulative change	Average	Change over year
77.5	-103	32.1	11	0.0	50.2	-1.6
976		33.7	-	1.7	51.6	+1.4
757	121	34.2	+1.6	2.7	52.9	+1.3
מעני	<u>.</u>	33.6	- 1	1.5	52.0	-0.9
900	154	o tr	-01	1.4	51.5	-0.5
347	-57	35.3	+1.8	3.4	52.3	+0.8
361	+14	36.6	<u>+</u>	4.5	52.6	+0.3
- 00	108	38.7	+2.1	9.9	53.1	, 0.5
200	, to	40.6	රා - - -	8.5	52.2	6.0—
200 181	ک ا	43.4	+2.8	11.3	50.8	4.1-
618	+37	44.3	6.0+	12.2	52.7	+1.9
799	181	410	-3.3	8.9	53.1	+0.4
200	485	30.05	-2.0	6.9	53.3	+0.2
200	-255	38.1	6.0—	0.9	54.7	+1.4
621	-	40.5	2.4	8.4	58.8	+4.1
250	+383	41.2	0.7	9.1	6.09	+2.1
427	+413	41.0	-0.2	6.8	60.7	-0.2

statistics 듄

971. 972. 973. 974. 975.

4. THE OFFICIAL VIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT

As noted in our 1972 paper, the usual official explanation is that "Unemployment and inflation are caused by excessive pay-increases" (page 24). However, there was certainly no benefit to working people from pay increases over the period 1960 to 1971, as is shown in the "estimated standard of living" changes in Table 6. Only in 1972 was there a substantial increase in the real standard of living—that is, in the amount of wage increase in relation to the price increase.

TABLE 6

Pay increases and the real standard of living

				=	
	Consum index!	er price	per unit	ome pay t of output t worker²	"Standard of living" ³ change
	Index	Change over year before %	Index	Change over year before %	Change over year before %
1960	67.4	1.2	71.7	5.1	3.9
1961	69.3	2.8	74.9	4.5	1.7
1962	72.0	3.9	78.0	4.1	0.2
1963	73.3	1.8	78.9	1.2	0.6
1964	75.9	3.5	81.2	2.9	-0.6
1965	79.6	4.9	84.8	4.4	-0.5
1966	82.9	4.1	88.8	4.7	0.6
1967	85.2	2.8	87.8	 1.1	—3.8
1968	89.4	4.9	89.3	1.7	3.1
1969	94.4	5.6	93.4	4.6	0.9
1970	100.0	5.9	100.0	7,1	1.1
1971	108.3	8.3	107.6	7.6	-0.6
1972	115.6	6.7	121.6	13.0	5.9
1973	125.3	8.4	134.7	10.8	2.2
1974	145.9	16.4	159.9	18.7	2.Q
1975	180.3	23.6	201.3	25.9	1.3
1976	208.0	15.4	220.9	9.7	-4.9

Source: Table 3, and general statistics publications.

Another official view was that profits were squeezed by excessive pay settlements. The overall effect of settlements on employers' costs is shown in Table 7 (page 17) where the change in employers' costs is compared to the change in general level of prices. The gradual increase in net costs over the period from 1960 to 1970 can be seen from the increase in employers costs of 56% (from 64.3 to 100.0) compared with an increase of 44% (from 69.4 to 100.0) in prices.

The Conservative Government relaxed the pressure from 1970 to 1973, but a Labour Government has again pushed up employers' costs.

TABLE 7
Employers' Costs

		• •	=		
	Employe of emplo per unit	yment	General of prices		Net relative change in employers' costs ³
	Index	Change over year before %	Index	Change over year before %	Change over year before
1960	64.3	3.4	69.4	2.1	1.3
1961	67.3	4.7	71.7	3.3	1.4
1962	70.3	4.5	74.1	3.3	1.2
1963	71.1	1.1	75.8	2.3	-1.2
1964	72.8	2.4	77.8	2.6	0.2
1965	76.7	5.4	81.1	4.2	1,2
1966	81.0	5.6	84.3	3.9	1,6
1967	83.4	3.0	86.6	2.7	0.3
1968	86.3	3.5	89.6	3.5	0.0
1969	91.5	6.0	92.8	3.6	2.3
1970	100.0	9.3	100.0	7.8	1,4
1971	106.9	6.9	110.4	10.4	-3.4
1972	117.5	9.9	121.6	10.1	-0.2
1973	125.8	7.1	131.8	8.4	—1.2
1974	152.7	21.4	153.7	16.6	4.1
1975	202.7	32.7	197.6	28.6	3.2
1976	225.8	11.4	225.4	14.1	2.4

Source: Table 6, and 1966-76 Blue Book, Tables 2.1 and 2.5.

¹ Prices for consumer expenditure (Table 6)

² Employees' remainder after tax (Table 3), per unit of real output as measured by real gross domestic product, and per worker, as measured by "employees in employment".

³ Take-home-pay adjusted for change in consumer prices.

¹ Total as shown in Supplement E, adjusted for real gross domestic product change.

Prices for total gross domestic product.

³ Compared to average level of prices as shown.

5. WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Above all there should be a reduction in the overall level of taxation.

This should be focussed on two main areas:

- (a) Income taxes paid by people earning their money should be reduced and Indirect taxes increased:
- (b) taxes on *changes* in capital assets by any individual or group should be completely abolished; these taxes—stamp duties and capital gains tax—though comparatively small (see Supplement C) impede the free flow of capital necessary for a flexible and growing society. If politically necessary, these taxes could be replaced by higher taxes on *total* assets—capital transfer tax.

The above measures would unquestionably lower the level of unemployment by stimulating private industry and directing it to growth areas.

Secondly the level of inflation must be reduced by reducing government expenditure and by changing the National Loans Act 1968, which enables the Treasury, whenever public expenditure exceeds current income, to cover the deficit by raising money "in such manner and on such terms and conditions as the Treasury thinks fit".

The public Income for the years 1970 to 1976 is detailed in Supplement F and public Expenditure on Current and Capital account in Supplement G. The annual balances between them are summarised in Table 8 (page 19).

Government borrowing has always been associated with high inflation—e.g. when government has a free reign as in time of war, or as in South America. In the table below, inflation for 1970-1976 (as Table 6—page 16) is adjusted net of the "borrowing requirement" or pressure to borrow:

	Inflation (Consumer price index) % per year	Government borrowing pressure (requirement as % of GDP)	Net inflationary pressure (inflation net of government borrowing pressure) % per year
1970	5.9	-0.4	6.3
1971	8.3	2.7	5.5
1972	6.7	3.8	2.8
1973	8.4	5.8	2.5
1974	16.4	7.6	8.2
1975	23.6	10.8	11.6
1976	15.4	7.3	7.5

¹ As shown in Table 8 with opposite sign (as deficit)

It can be seen that, over the period 1972 to 1976, government borrowing pressure appeared to be responsible for about one-half of the total amount of Inflation.

TABLE 8

General Government Finances

Balance of Receipts and Expenditure (£ million)

					•		
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Total receipts ¹	20,859	21,889	24,144	26,831	33,572	41,381	50,585
Current expenditure2	16,105	17,911	20,781	23,764	30,727	40,732	48,265
Equals surplus of total receipts over							
current expenditure Less:	4,754	3,978	3,363	3,067	2,845	649	2,320
Capital expenditure?	4,601	5,288	5,473	6,736	8,461	10,678	10,241
Equals general government "borrowing require- ment", or deficit (—) excess of Total expenditure							
over Total receipts As % of gross domestic	+153-	-1,310-	-2,110	3,669-	-5,616	—10,029 -	-7,921
product	+0.4	2.7	—3.8	5.8	 7.6	-10.8	— 7.3

See Supplement F for details.

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The above table is a useful indication of the immediate relationship between 'The Government borrowing requirement' and 'Inflation', as portrayed by the Consumer Price Index. However, we think it may be helpful to amplify our view of the source of Inflation.

We believe that Inflation can only be caused by an excessive increase in the money supply: in other words, by a failure of the Government to keep the increase in the money supply closely in line with the true increase in the Gross National Product, and not just its monetary value.

² See Supplement G for details.

We further hold that the only way in which the money supply can be increased in Britain is by the action of Government Agencies.

Thus, when the Government spends more than its income from taxation in any year, the difference is described as the "borrowing requirement". If the Government borrows the whole sum internally from British citizens, in such a manner that the purchasing power is transferred from the Civilian Sector to the Government, there will be no increase in the money supply. It will not be Inflationary.

However, if the Government borrows from the Banks, it will generally result in an increase in the money supply because the method used by the Government to borrow from Banks is against Treasury Bills which, by convention, are treated by the Banks as equivalent to the cash in their tills. Consequently, the Banks do not transfer purchasing power from the Civilian Sector to the Government—indeed, the Banks can at any time present Treasury Bills to the Bank of England and demand cash in exchange, which must be printed by the Bank of England.

Another way in which the money supply can be increased is by the Government or civilians borrowing foreign currency.

If foreign currency is borrowed in order to buy foreign goods (e.g. if dollars are borrowed to purchase American aircraft) there is no increase in our money supply, but if foreign currency is borrowed to pay for internal expenditure (e.g. to build a Municipal Swimming Pool) there is likely to be an increase in the money supply because the foreign currency must, by law, be sold to the Exchange Equalisation Fund for sterling. The Fund is obliged to purchase any foreign currency offered to it.

The total borrowing of foreign currency often exceeds the sterling at the disposal of the Fund. In that event, the Fund draws upon the Treasury for the necessary sterling, which adds to the borrowing requirement of the Government, which, as we have shown, is likely to increase the money supply.

A further factor is that the Consumer Price Index is not an immediate measure of an increase in the money supply. Experience shows that it may take anything from 9 months to 2 years before an increase in the money supply produces its full effect in the form of additional demand for goods and services, which leads to that general increase in consumer prices, as shown by the Consumer Price Index, which is the ultimate evidence of Inflation.

It should always be borne in mind that the price of particular commodities may be pushed up by special factors—e.g. the price of coffee may rise due to a world shortage resulting from a bad crop; or oil prices may increase because the producers decide to exercise their monopoly power; or again the price of private houses in S.E. England may increase still further because the Planning Authorities may continue to prevent

new building in S.E. England, in spite of increasing demand. Such price increases are not caused by Inflation.

In brief, consumer prices can be increased by factors other than inflation in the true sense of that word. It is only when consumer prices as a whole, as recorded in the Consumer Price Index, are forced up that we have proof that the money supply has been increased.

The only remedy for Inflation is to cut Government expenditure and so eliminate the excessive borrowing requirement.

APPENDIX

⋖
SUPPLEMENT A
•

۲	۲Ľ	= 1	A	ט	IX	•																				
	Total taxes	on income ³			2,913	3,006	3,249	3,584	3,655	3,638	4,150	4,652	4,688	5,034	5,765	6,370	7,171	7,920	8,680	10,107	10,719	11,416	13,232	17,548	23,373	27,150
	Employers	total tax	on income ²		502	503	552	677	679	687	820	936	666	1,090	1,297	1,026	2,113	2,361	2,471	2,990	2,967	3,136	3,900	5,631	6,334	7,140
	Employee	national	insurance	contributions	315	338	348	461	479	488	569	640	692	762	854	868	943	1,066	1,103	1,298	1,376	1,623	1,883	2,209	2,760	3,341
f million)	Total	employee,	capital and	grants	2,096	2,165	2,349	2,449	2,497	2,463	2,761	3,076	2,997	3,182	3,614	4,446	4,115	4,493	5,106	5,819	6,376	6,657	7,449	9,708	14,278	16,669
es on income (Tax on Tax on Total	employees	earnings		782.	. 168	1.018*	1,098	1,134*	1,277*	1.448*	1,617	1,593*	1,780*	2,157*	2,556	2,803	3,137	3,610	4,309	4,681	4,918	5,952	8,040	11,835	13,551
Tax	Tax on	income from	capital		1.286	1 246*	1.301	1,318*	1,331	1,151	1.276*	1 420*	1,356*	1 348	1.396*	1,825	1,240	1,241	1,366	1,370	1,532	1,588	1,347	1,421	2,112	2,636
	Tax on	grants by	government		28.	28*	30.	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	32*	35	37	33	48	54	61	65	72	115	130	140	163	151	150	247	331	482
										096					1965		1967			970						1976.
					955	956	957	958	959	960	961	962	963	964	965	996	967	968	6961	970	971	972	973	974	975	976

8

Taxes on expenditure

1955 419 1956 458 1957 494		1		:	•		
18x 419 458 494 497	Value	l otal	Specific	Specific	Rates*	Total	Tota!
419 458 494 497	u		357.	excise duties³			taxes on
458 494 497	I	419	, 	1,674	475	2 149	2 568
494	1	458	1	1,740	556	2.296	2,250
497	l	494	i	1,778	615	2 393	7 887
)	I	497	I	1,820	650	2.470	2,967
501	I	501	I	1,879	714	2.593	3.094
510	I	510	ļ	2,003	177	2,774	3,284
1961 521	1	521	l	2,178	831	3,009	3 530
571	I	571	J	2,297	916	3,213	3.784
565	J	565	I	2,356	1,014	3,370	3.935
633	I	633	1	2,625	1,096	3,721	4,354
. 647	i	647	l	3,008	1,228	4,236	4,883
1966 686	1	989	141	3.142	1,374	4.657	5 343
748	I	748	470	3,220	1,467	5,197	5,905
1/6	I	971	531	3,641	1,548	5,720	6,691
011,1	I	1,110	99/	4,105	1,678	6,549	7.659
1,304	I	1,304	850	4,310	1,827	6,987	8,291
19711.394	I	1,394	999	4,500	2,086	7,252	8.646
_	l	1,389	449	4,823	2,379	7 651	9.040
	1,737	2,117	132	5,021	2,647	7.800	9917
1	2,721	2,721	1	5,478	3,057	8,535	11.256
1	3,506	3,506	I	6,391	3,983	10,374	13,880
1	3,982	3,982	I	7,862	4,540	12,402	16,384

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Tables 7.1 and 9.7; also earlier Blue Books.

• An adjustment has been made to official published figures to allow for subsequent alterations made to official figures; this is made necessary by the opicy of the Central Statistical Office of revising many figures back for many years, without publishing all altered figures (many countries find it possible to settle on figures for national income accounts after a few years—and do not thereafter after them). The adjustment made necessary here amounted to only 0.4%.

1 "Rentier" incomes, including rent, dividends and interest, etc.

2 Includes insurance payments. See Supplement D for details.

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Tables 7.1 and 8.1; also earlier Blue Books.

Rates, however, vary according to industry.

Tax on service industries.

Petroleum, tobacco, alcohol, betting and gaming, motor vehicle duties etc., net.

Tax on housing.

SUPPLEMENT D

Total tax on Income of Employers

			TAXE	s		Levied contri- butions	Total
		Corpora-	Less			to	taxes
	Profits	tion	over-	S.E.T.	Total	National	and
	tax	tax	spill		taxes	Insur-	levies
			relief			ance	
1955	223	_	_	_	223	279	502
1956	199	_	_	_	199	304	503
1957	243	-	_		243	309	552
1958	279	_			279	398	677
1959	261	_	_		261	418	679
1960	262	_		_	262	425	687
1961	317	_	_	_	317	503	820
1962	379	_	_	_	379	557	936
1963	388	_	_	_	388	611	999
1964	408	_	_		408	682	1,090
1965	466				466	831	1,297
1966	135	23	-38	141	261	906	1,167
1967	39	1,166	—58	470	1,617	966	2,583
1968	12	1,287	—37	531	1,793	1,099	2,892
1969	4	1,386	60	766	2,096	1,141	3,237
1970	2	1,663	—31	850	2,484	1,356	3,840
1971	1	1,535	-28	666	2,174	1,459	3,633
1972	1	1,449	—24	449	1,875	1,710	3,585
1973	1	1,867	-22	132	1,978	2,054	4,032
1974	_	2,865	—25	_	2,840	2,791	5,631
1975	_	2,284	—2 5		2,259	4,075	6,334
1976		2,081	-26		2,055	5,085	7,140

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Tables 7.1 and 9.7; also earlier Blue Books.

955 184 956 166 957 176 958 182 959 212							
		Capital Iolal	Capital	Betterment	Stamp	Total	on capital
		tax.	gains tax	levy, etc¹	duties		
	1	184	I	i	75	75	259
	1	166	1	ι	63	63	229
	ţ	176	I	ı	68	68	244
		182	I	l	61	61	243
		212	1	ļ	93	93	305
	1	236	1	I	94	94	330
	1	259	I	I	97	97	356
	1	266	I	l	92	92	361
	}	308	I	I	92	92	9
	1	307	-	1	83	84	391
	!		m	I	92	79	366
	l	308	7	l	78	85	393
•	ţ	317	22	ı	91	114	431
	ì	374	51	12	118	181	555
	I	372	156	97	123	376	748
	1	378	264	31	124	419	797
	ì	403	245	15	141	401	804
1971	ļ	482	263	Ξ	224	498	980
	1	420	397	9	205	809	1,028
	ļ	379	478	က	179	099	1,039
	l	307	520	7	266	788	1,095
	31	390	494	-	276	177	1,161

SUPPLEMENT E

Total cost to employers of giving employment (£ million)

		Gove	rnment ta	exes and levi	es	
	Wages and Salaries	Employers' contribu- tions to super- annuation funds	S.E.T.	National Insurance	Total	Total employers' cost of giving employ ment
1955	10,210	399	_	268	268	10,877
1956	11,125	442		293	293	11,860
1957	11,765	497		299	299	12,561
1958	12.135	542	_	386	386	13,063
1959	12,725	575	_	406	406	13,706
1960	13,735	621	-	414	414	14,770
1961	14,855	664	_	492	492	16,011
1962	15,640	708	_	547	547	16,895
1963	16,395	770	_	601	601	17,766
1964	17.765	822	_	671	671	19,258
1965	19,111	883		818	818	20,812
1966	20,389	996	141	892	1,033	22,418
1967	21,173	1,088	470	952	1,422	23,683
1968	22,566	1,201	531	1,082	1,613	25,380
1969	24,188	1,292	766	1,124	1,890	27,370
1970	26,984	1,417	850	1,336	2,186	30,587
1971	29,673	1,769	666	1,438	2,104	33,546
1972	33,141	2,203	449	1,682	2,131	37,475
1973	38,024	2,568	132	2,018	2,150	42,742
1974	45,856	3,020	_	2,747	2,747	51,623
1975	59,300	4,016		4,012	4,012	67,328
1976	67,185	4,896		5,005	5,005	77,086

Source: See Tables 2 and 3.

SUPPLEMENT F

General Government Receipts1

(£ million)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Taxes and other levies:							
Taxes on income	7,453	7,884	8,083	9,295	12,548	16.537	18,724
Taxes on expenditure?	6,588	6,701	6,885	7,475	8,378		12,120
Nat. Insurance levies	2,654	2,835	3,333	3,937	5,000	6,835	
Local authority rates	1,827	2,086	2,379	2,647	3,057	3,983	4.540
Taxes on capital ³	673	663	756	823	860	829	885
TOTAL taxes and levies	19,195	20,169	21,436	24,177	29,843	38,347	44,695
Gross trading surpluses	151	177	140	135	132	143	120
Rent	703	737	758	971	1,247	1,546	1,930
etc Net receipts from other	899	1,031	1,167	1,349	1,748	2,051	2,444
transactions including							
financial	89	—225	643	199	602	—706	1,396
TOTAL RECEIPTS	20,859	21,889	24,144	26,831	33,572	41,381	50,585

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Table 9.1.

For central government and local authorities; excludes public corporations.

Including stamp duties.

Excluding stamp duties.

SUPPLEMENT G

Total Government Expenditure

(£ million)

		(L I	шиоп				
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Current account:							
Current expenditure							
on goods and services	8,692	9,903	11,276	12,753	15,981	22,094	25,742
Subsidies	876	931	1,144	1,471	2,987	3,827	3,463
Current grants to per-							
sons	4,334	4,783	5,844	6,421	7,869	10,201	12,822
Current grants abroad	177	205	210	359	320	379	792
Debt interest	2,026	2,089	2,307	2,760	3,570	4,231	5,446
Total CURRENT expen-							
diture	16,105	17,911	20,781	23,764	30,727	40,732	48,265
Capital account:							
Gross domestic fixed							
capital formation	2,431	2,562	2.731	3,660	4,410	5,030	5,382
Capital consumption							
(non-trading)	272	309	354	445	522	652	820
Increase in value of							
stocks	43	51	27	34	32	37	39
Capital grants to							
private sector	797	913	820	980	1,107	1,202	1,421
Net lending to public							
corporations, private							
sector and overseas	1,058	1,453	1,541	1,617	2,390	3,757	2,579
Total CAPITAL expen-							
diture	4,601	5,288	5,473	6,736	8,461	10,678	10,241
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	20,706	23,199	26,254	30,500	39,188	51,410	58,506

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Table 9.1.

SUPPLEMENT H

General Government and Public Corporation Capital Expenditure¹ on Income-earning services

(£ million)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Public corporations: ² Transport and com-							
munication	686	791	798	997	1,099	1,407	1,590
Fuel and power	742	744	666	704	911	1,299	1,555
Iron and steel	108	198	210	170	256	401	565
Housing	123	108	79	160	246	354	445
Other corporations	20	21	21	30	303	488	575
TOTAL public corpora-							
tions	1,679	1,862	1,774	2,061	2,815	3,949	4,730
Local authorities,							
housing	744	670	655	975	1,717	2,064	2,222
Central government and local authorities:							
Transport and com-							
munications Other industry and	48	32	25	39	39	40	46
trade	60	76	73	92	95	120	116
TOTAL central govern- ment and local auth-							
orities	852	778	753 ———	1,106	1,851	2,224	2,384
TOTAL ON INCOME-							
EARNING SERVICES	2,531	2,640	2,527	3,167	4,666	6,173	7,114

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Table 6.5 and 9.4.

On gross fixed capital formation.
 See also Supplement J.

SUPPLEMENT I

General Government Capital Expenditure¹ on Non-trading services (£ million)

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Social services: Education National health ser-vices Public health services.... Personal social ser-vices..... Employment services..... Research..... Libraries, museums and arts..... 1,080 1,236 TOTAL on social services Infrastructure and environment: Services to agriculture, forestry, fishing and food Roads and public light-ing Water, sewage and refuse disposal Land drainage and coast protection..... Parks, pleasure grounds etc..... 1,094 1,088 1,192 1,020 TOTAL on infrastructure Security services: Defence, military and civil..... Fire service Parliament and law courts Police..... Prisons TOTAL on security ser-vices

Other services:							
Central government	57	67	64	85	94	128	154
Local authorities	120	148	137	210	304	310	306
TOTAL on other services	177	215	201	295	398	438	460
TOTAL ON NON-							
TRADING SERVICES	1,579	1,784	1,978	2,554	2,559	2,806	2,998

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Table 9.4.

1 On gross fixed capital formation.

SUPPLEMENT J

Public Corporation Finances (£ million)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Gross trading surplus	1,447 74	1,520 84	1,681 125	2,063 123			4,460 218
Other net receipts	104	102	107	222	293		461
TOTAL net surpluses Less	1,625	1,706	1,913	2,408	2,988	3,558	5,139
Interest, dividends and taxes	794	896	983	1,212	1,641	1,962	2,390
Equals							
Total net surplus be- fore depreciation Capital expenditure	831	810	930	1,196	1,347	1,596	2,749
Gross domestic fixed capital formation	1,679	1,862	1,774	2,061	2,815	3,949	4,730
stocks	65	153	82	137	344	916	821
TOTAL capital expendi-							
ture	1,744	2,015	1,856	2,198	3,159	4,865	5,551
Net surplus before de- preciation							
Less Capital expenditure							
Equals Gross deficit (—)	012	1 205	000	1.000	1 012	2 260	າດດາ
Plus	-913-	-1,205	-926	-1,002-	-1,612	-3,209-	2,602
Capital transfers etc	81	107	172	139	261	325	391
Equals Net deficit ()	—832 -	-1.098	 754	863-	-1,551	-2,944-	-2,411
Of which, Financed by Joans							
from central govern- ment (net)	852	1,145	1,039	710	685	1,762	1,139
(including other bor- rowing)	-20	- 47	-285	153	866	1,182	1,272

Source: 1966-76 Blue Book, Tables 6.2 and 6.3.

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